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Abstract
In low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), making the best use of scarce resources is essential to
achieving universal health coverage. The design of health benefits packages creates the opportunity
to select interventions on the basis of explicit objectives. Distributional cost-effectiveness analysis
(DCEA) provides a framework to evaluate interventions based on two objectives: increasing popula-
tion health and reducing health inequality. We conduct aggregate DCEA of potential health benefits
package interventions to demonstrate the feasibility of this approach in LMICs, using the case of the
Malawian health benefits package. We use publicly available survey and census data common to
LMICs and describe what challenges we encountered and how we addressed them. We estimate that
diseases targeted by the health benefits package aremost prevalent in the poorest population quintile
and least prevalent in the richest quintile. The survey data we use indicate socioeconomic patterns in
intervention uptake that diminish the population health gain and inequality reduction from the pack-
age. We find that a similar set of interventions would be prioritized when impact on health inequality
is incorporated alongside impact on overall population health. However, conclusions about the im-
pact of individual interventions on health inequalities are sensitive to assumptions regarding the
health opportunity cost, the utilization of interventions, the distribution of diseases across population
groups and the level of aversion to inequality. Our results suggest that efforts to improve access to
the Essential Health Package could be targeted to specific interventions to improve the health of the
poorest fastest but that identifying these interventions is uncertain. This exploratory work has shown
the potential for applying the DCEA framework to inform health benefits package design within the
LMIC setting and to provide insight into the equity impact of a health benefits package.
Keywords: Health benefits package, distributional cost-effectiveness analysis, low- and middle-income country, Malawi, priority
setting, health equity
Introduction
Recent examples from low and middle-income countries (LMICs) in
Africa (Todd et al., 2016) and Latin America (Giedion et al., 2014)
demonstrate the use of health benefits packages as a means of focus-
ing scarce resources on interventions that provide the best value for
money (Glassman et al., 2016). The National Health Policy in
Malawi (2017–22) documents the Malawi Government’s aim to
move towards universal health coverage of its Essential Health
Package (EHP). The redesign of the EHP in 2017 was informed
using cost-effectiveness analyses (Ochalek et al., 2018) that provide
information on the cost per disability adjusted life year (DALY)
averted of potential interventions. When combined with an estimate
of the DALYs that could be averted with alternative uses of health
sector funds, this allows interventions to be ranked based on the net
DALYs averted. This is useful if the objective is to maximize popula-
tion health benefits, i.e. DALYs averted, from the available budget.
In Malawi, as in many LMICs, the intention is that the health
benefits packages address another key consideration, namely equity
in health, healthcare access and use. The burden of ill health is great-
est in the poorest, as indicated in Malawi by the higher rate of infant
mortality, stunting, underweight, diarrhoea and respiratory disease
in poorer groups compared to richer (Zere et al., 2007). This
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inequality is exacerbated by disproportionately higher utilization of
healthcare among the rich (Zere et al., 2007). Both the Malawi
National Policy and Health Sector Strategic Plan identify the reduc-
tion of health inequalities as a goal (Zere et al., 2007; Umuhoza and
Ataguba, 2018). However, equity was considered informally in the
process of designing the EHP, due to the lack of evidence on the
health inequality impacts of interventions.
Using the Malawian EHP as an example, this article explores the
potential for providing information on the health inequality impacts
of interventions, in settings characterized by incomplete or frag-
mented national data systems. Such information would allow for the
selection of interventions into a health benefits package based on
their ability to increase population health and to reduce health in-
equality. It could also be used to show the overall impact of the
health benefits package on health inequality and the potential value
of eliminating inequality in access, and of achieving full coverage.
We apply aggregate-level distributional cost-effectiveness ana-
lysis (DCEA) (Love-Koh et al., 2019), using publicly available data
sources, to potential EHP interventions. In essence, we aim to deter-
mine how much of the total population net health benefit from each
intervention would fall to different equity relevant population
groups, defined by area of residence and wealth. This would allow
an assessment of how interventions change the distribution of health
across those groups (Asaria et al., 2015; Dawkins et al., 2018). We
show how an explicit value judgement, about how much society val-
ues increase in population health compared to reduction in health
inequality, can be used to rank interventions where there are trade-
offs. We highlight the challenges and assumptions required to per-
form this analysis for Malawi and suggest methods to overcome
them.
Materials and methods
Data sources
We use a database of cost-effectiveness evidence that was established
to inform the design of the Malawian EHP (Ochalek et al., 2018).
The database included intervention cost and health effects from the
Tufts Global Health Cost-Effectiveness Registry, WHO Choice and
systematic reviews (Ochalek et al., 2018) and local epidemiological
estimates of the size of the eligible population for each intervention
(Ochalek et al., 2016). Complete information was available for 73
interventions (Ochalek et al., 2016), of which 51 are included in the
current EHP.
For national estimates of total population size, age and gender
distribution, as well as the proportions living in urban and rural
areas, we use the preliminary results of the 2018 Malawi Population
and Housing Census (National Statistical Office, 2018). We use esti-
mates of the marginal productivity of the health service in Malawi
of one DALY averted per $61 USD (Ochalek et al., 2016) additional
expenditure.
To estimate socioeconomic distributions of mortality rates, dis-
ease and healthcare utilization, we use information from the
Demographic Household Survey (DHS) 2015–16, the Integrated
Household Survey (IHS) 2016–17 and the Multiple Indicator
Cluster Survey (MICS) 2013–14. These surveys are typical of the
evidence available in settings such as Malawi and record socioeco-
nomic information alongside disease burden and care seeking
behaviour.
The IHS captures self-reported disease occurrence by asking an
open question ‘During the last 2weeks, did you suffer from an ill-
ness or injury?’ followed by the specification ‘What was the illness
or injury?’. These questions are accompanied by questions about
care seeking: ‘Who diagnosed the disease?’ and ‘What actions did
you take to find relief for your illness?’. The answers have categories
such as ‘I sought treatment at gov. health facility, church-based fa-
cility, village health clinic/health surveillance assistant’. This allows
us to identify service utilization with the providers of the EHP. For
example, in Malawi, the anticipated EHP providers are governmen-
tal and church-based care facilities. The DHS and MICS have a nar-
rower focus than the IHS but add information on aspects of
preventive care, nutrition and sexual health not captured in the IHS.
The DHS includes questions about the age at death of respondent’s
offspring and siblings. All three provide information on respondent’s
age, gender, household composition, education status, housing and
asset ownership.
The Global Burden of Disease Study (GBD) informs the overall
level of health in terms of life expectancy and disease burden. For
Malawi, GBD mortality estimates are based on several waves of the
DHS, the Malawi Diffusion and Ideational Change Project, the
Malawi Malaria Indicator Survey, the MICS, the Malawi
Population and Housing Census, the Malawi Population Change
Survey and the Malawi Family Formation Survey 1984. GBD uses
86 data sources for cause of death estimates and 155 data sources of
non-fatal health outcomes [Institute of Health Metrics (IHME),
2018]. For each condition, GBD provides years of life lost to disabil-
ity for the whole population, or in rates per 100 000. The GBD does
not provide information on the differences between socioeconomic
groups.
Methods
We focus on the reduction in inequality in health-adjusted life ex-
pectancy (HALE) and the inequality associated with two socioeco-
nomic characteristics: household wealth and urban vs rural
residence. We therefore estimate distributions of health by stratify-
ing the population into two subgroups based on residence and five
subgroups based on a wealth asset index. We use the International
Wealth Index to provide a common asset index across the surveys
Key Messages
• Health benefits packages that move countries towards universal health coverage can be designed to improve population
health and equity.
• The application of formal quantitative methods to examine value for money and distributional impacts can be challeng-
ing in settings with limited and fragmented health data.
• Using the case study of the Malawian Essential Health Package, we demonstrate the application of an aggregate distri-
butional cost-effectiveness framework to support the prioritization of health interventions into a health benefits package.
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(Smits and Steendijk, 2015). The International Wealth Index assigns
a score to each survey respondent that ranges from 0 (possesses
none of the assets) to 100 (possesses all of the assets). By dividing
the population into quintiles based on this index, we thus describe
five subgroups of the population ranked by their asset ownership.
We label these subgroups ‘poorest’, ‘poorer’, ‘middle’, ‘richer’ and
‘richest’, describing their relative wealth position.
We determine how interventions alter the health of different
groups in the population. Cost-effectiveness studies analyse how
introducing a given intervention would alter healthcare costs and
population health outcomes, compared to the status quo. For ex-
ample, the introduction of Rotavirus vaccination would cost an add-
itional $0.69 and avert an additional 0.14 DALYs per child under
one, compared to providing no vaccination. Interventions influence
health directly, by offering health benefits to recipients (e.g. 0.14
DALYs). They also influence health indirectly, through the oppor-
tunity cost of being unable to use the resources each commands (e.g.
$0.69) for other purposes. The incremental cost that each interven-
tion imposes on the health system displaces alternative investments,
leading to opportunity costs in the form of foregone health benefits.
The marginal productivity of health service expenditure describes
the rate at which costs impose foregone health benefits (e.g. $0.69
divide $61¼0.01 DALYs). These forgone benefits are accounted for
when interventions are evaluated using net health benefit, which
describes the incremental direct health benefit minus the health op-
portunity cost. The net health benefit of Rotavirus vaccination is
0.14–0.69/61¼0.13 DALYs.
net health benefit ¼ incremental health benefit
 health opportunity cost:
An aggregate DCEA takes the average incremental costs and
health benefits reported from existing cost-effectiveness studies
and combines these with socioeconomic distributions of utilization
and opportunity cost to estimate how the net health benefit from an
intervention is divided among equity relevant subgroups within the
population.
The socioeconomic distribution of incremental net health benefit
that we estimate for each intervention is added to a baseline distri-
bution of HALE. The level of inequality in the distribution of HALE
with each intervention is compared to the level of inequality in the
baseline distribution, to estimate the potential change in inequality
from each intervention.
We use the estimated impacts of the 51 EHP interventions in our
sample to represent the socioeconomic impacts that might be
obtained with 1 year of implementation of the full EHP and to esti-
mate the potential value of increasing uptake from current levels to
the full eligible population.
In the following four sections, we describe in more detail the
methods applied, the data requirements, which data sources are uti-
lized in our example, and our assumptions:
1. the estimation of the distributional impact of interventions,
2. the estimation of the baseline health distribution,
3. measurement of inequality and priority setting and
4. sensitivity analyses.
Method Stage 1: net distributional impact of health interventions
To calculate the distribution of the direct health benefits, i.e. the dir-
ect changes in health experienced by the recipients of any interven-
tion, we need to know the amount of health generated per use, and
how many individuals in each group receive the intervention.
We use the reported incremental health benefit in the database of
cost-effectiveness evidence to represent the direct benefit per use (i.e.
the number of DALYs averted). We assume this is the same for each
person receiving the intervention, regardless of whether the person is
in a rural or urban residence, or whether they are asset rich or asset
poor.
We use the IHS as the main source of information for the socioe-
conomic distributions of disease and healthcare utilization and add
information from DHS and MICS for interventions that were not
included in the IHS. For example, we use the DHS to identify the
distribution of insecticide-treated bed-nets. A full description of how
we match the survey questions to diseases and interventions is in the
Supplementary Appendix Table S1.
The total size of the eligible population over a period of 1 year
from the database of cost-effectiveness evidence is divided into soci-
oeconomic groups, according to the distribution of prevalence we
observe in the survey data. The overall number of eligible individu-
als is then multiplied by the proportion of the total survey reported
disease accounted for by each socioeconomic group, to give the
number of individuals who would benefit from the intervention in
each socioeconomic group per year.
We estimate the uptake of each intervention in each socioeco-
nomic group as the ratio of patients who report utilizing healthcare
for the condition, over the total number of patients who report expe-
riencing the disease. We assume that the socioeconomic pattern in
self-reported care seeking reflects the socioeconomic pattern of EHP
utilization. The eligible population in each socioeconomic group
multiplied by the uptake in that group determines the numbers of
individuals treated at current utilization patterns.
For missing information on the proportion of individuals in each
socioeconomic group who are eligible for an intervention, we use
the mean distribution of prevalence. For missing information on the
proportion of individuals who use interventions for which they are
eligible (missing utilization) in each socioeconomic group, we use
the mean uptake in each socioeconomic group multiplied by preva-
lence to get utilization.
In the absence of information about the degree to which changes
in healthcare expenditure would affect the health in each socioeco-
nomic group, we base our estimate of the distribution of health op-
portunity cost on the crude socioeconomic distribution of healthcare
utilization. We estimate the proportion of each socioeconomic sub-
group who sought care at a governmental or church-based health
provider (i.e. the facilities providing public health care) across all
disease reported in the IHS. We assume that this distribution of aver-
age utilization is a reasonable proxy for the marginal distribution.
That is, when interventions are introduced or displaced, the socioe-
conomic characteristics of the affected individuals match those
observed in average utilization. In essence, this assumes that the
socioeconomic distribution of health benefits, from increasing or
reducing healthcare budgets, is in line with the distribution of
healthcare utilization.
Box 1 illustrates each step of the calculations with a worked ex-
ample. This shows how we convert the incremental costs (B) and in-
cremental health benefit (C) reported for Rotavirus vaccination into
a distribution of net health benefit, using the size of the eligible
population (A), survey information (D, E, G) and estimating health
opportunity cost at a rate of one DALY per $61.
Method Stage 2: baseline distribution of health
The baseline distribution of health describes how mortality and
morbidity differ between socioeconomic groups without any of the
Health Policy and Planning, 2020, Vol. 0, No. 0 3
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EHP interventions. We calculate lifetables for each socioeconomic
group by adjusting the age-specific mortality rates from GBD,
according to the socioeconomic distribution observed in mortality
rates among respondent’s siblings and children reported in the DHS
(see Supplementary Table S2). The deaths occurred prior to 2015,
and hence prior to the imposition of the revised EHP in 2017. We
use respondent’s socioeconomic status as a proxy for that of their
children and siblings. In the base case analysis, we combine deaths
reported for respondent’s sons and daughters (deaths reported for
ages 0–35 years) with deaths reported for respondent’s siblings
(deaths reported across all ages) and estimate mortality rates in 5
year bands up to age 55. We combine age 55–75 into one group and
do not include deaths reported at older than age 75. The Sullivan
method (Sullivan, 1971; Jagger et al., 2006) is used to calculate life
expectancy from the constructed life tables. Life expectancy in each
socioeconomic group is then adjusted for years lost due to disability
(YLD) to generate HALE. We use the YLD rates for each age group
reported in the GBD. We match 19 diseases from GBD to one of 15
self-reported diseases across the DHS, IHS and MICS
(Supplementary Table S3). The socioeconomic distribution in these
15 linked diseases is then used to proxy the distribution of the total
YLD burden. Detailed descriptions of these calculations are found
in the Supplementary Material.
Method Stage 3: measurement of inequality
We assess the impact of interventions on inequality in HALE based
on the change in the Atkinson index. The Atkinson index measures
relative inequality in a distribution, with weights for individuals
determined by their level of health and the strength of aversion to
health inequality. From the Atkinson index, we can determine the
equally distributed equivalent (EDE) level of health, which is the
amount of health that, if provided equally to everyone within a
population, has the same worth as the current distribution (Asaria
et al., 2016). The EDE increases with the total amount of health and
reduces with the degree of inequality in the distribution of health.
The difference between the EDE level of health and the average
population health can be interpreted as the cost of health inequality.
The formula for EDE based on an Atkinson index is:
hEDE ¼
1
n
Xn
i¼1
h
ð1eÞ
i
2
4
3
5
1
1eð Þ
;
where e is the inequality aversion parameter, hi is the health of indi-
vidual i and n is the total number of individuals in the population. In
the absence of an estimate from Malawi, we use a starting value for
the inequality aversion parameter of 10 (Robson et al., 2017).
Although the strength of aversion may differ depending on the na-
ture of the inequality, to demonstrate our results in the base case, we
apply this same value to represent aversion against inequality be-
tween wealth quintiles and between urban/rural residences.
We compare how introduction of an intervention would change
the, EDE to how it would change overall population health.
Interventions that increase population health and reduce health in-
equality will have an EDE impact greater than the net health impact,
while interventions that increase health but increase health inequal-
ity will increase EDE by less than the amount they increase popula-
tion health. We use this difference between EDE impact and net
health benefit to describe the value of interventions’ impact on
health inequality in terms of DALYs averted. We present our results
in the health equity impact plane—a graph showing incremental
population net health benefit on the y axis and inequality impact on
the x axis (Cookson et al., 2017).
Method Stage 4: sensitivity analyses
A summary of the key assumptions is given in Box 2. We apply ex-
tensive sensitivity analyses to test alternative assumptions for the
distribution of the direct benefits of interventions, the health oppor-
tunity cost, the baseline distribution of health and the level of in-
equality aversion.
Sensitivity Analysis 1: two alternative estimates for the socioeco-
nomic distribution of direct health benefits were defined. One scen-
ario assumes equal prevalence across wealth quintiles. The second
reflects a more unequal distribution by wealth quintile, where we in-
crease prevalence for the poorest and poorer quintiles by 10% and
decrease the prevalence for the richer and richest quintiles by 10%.
In both scenarios, we retain the original uptake pattern.
Sensitivity Analysis 2: we explore the impact of different uptake
patterns and retain the original prevalence distribution. One scen-
ario assumes that all wealth quintiles have the population average
Box 1. Example calculations with Rotavirus vaccination
Rotavirus vaccination for children under 1
Total population (A) 521 300
Incremental health benefit (B) 0.14
Incremental cost (C) $0.69
Total cost (A  C) $809 318
Poorest Poorer Middle Richer Richest Total
% survey reported cases of rotavirus (D) 36 16 23 13 12 100
DALYs averted if everyone vaccinated (A  B D) 26 274 11 677 16 786 9488 8758 72 982
Uptake of vaccination (%) (E) 48 39 46 49 43 45
1. DALYs averted at current uptake (A  B  D  E) 12 611 4554 7721 4649 3766 33 302
Proportion of direct health benefit by subgroup 0.38 0.14 0.23 0.14 0.11 1
Cost by subgroup (A  C  E) $172 655 $140 282 $165 461 $176 252 $154 670 $809 318
Proportion of opportunity cost by subgroup (F) 0.23 0.22 0.2 0.19 0.16 1
2. Health opportunity cost by subgroup [F  (A  C/61)] 3052 2919 2654 2521 2123 13 268
3. Net health benefit by subgroup (1–2) 9560 1635 5068 2128 1643 20 034
Proportion of net health benefit by subgroup 0.48 0.08 0.25 0.11 0.08
4 Health Policy and Planning, 2020, Vol. 0, No. 0
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level of uptake and a second scenario increased uptake in the poorest
and poorer wealth quintiles by 10% and reduces uptake in the richer
and richest quintiles by 10%.
Sensitivity Analysis 3: we vary the marginal productivity of the
health service (i.e. the rate at which changes in expenditure generate
health opportunity cost) between one DALY per additional $37
(higher opportunity cost) and one DALY per additional $116 (lower
opportunity cost), on the basis of the range of empirical estimates
for the region (Ochalek et al., 2015; Woods et al., 2016). In add-
ition, we test two scenarios reflecting different distributions of op-
portunity across the wealth quintiles. We test a scenario where each
wealth quintile bears an equal of 20% of the health opportunity cost
and a more unequal scenario where we increase the proportion of
the opportunity cost borne by the poorest and poorer quintiles by
10% and reduce the proportion borne by the richer and richest quin-
tiles by 10%.
Sensitivity Analysis 4: for the baseline distribution of health, we
test if the results change when the socioeconomic distribution of
HALE is informed by the socioeconomic pattern of deaths that
respondents report for their sons and daughters, up to age at the
death of 20 years only.
Sensitivity Analysis 5: we vary the inequality aversion parameter
to 2 (reflecting lower aversion to inequality) and 25 (reflecting very
strong aversion to inequality).
Results
Socioeconomic profile of EHP-targeted diseases
Table 1 shows the population estimates, disease burden, service util-
ization and proportion of the health opportunity cost from changes
in public healthcare expenditure for each socioeconomic group.
Malawi has a population of 17 million, of whom 85% live in rural
areas and 15% live in urban areas (National Statistical Office,
2018). There are 44 million cases of illness that qualify for treatment
with one of the 51 EHP interventions reported in the health sector
strategic plan (Government of the Republic of Malawi, 2017). Out
of 44 million cases, we estimate that health services were utilized for
20 million, giving average uptake of health services of 45%. We esti-
mate that, of the 20 million episodes of care with EHP interventions,
11% are to individuals from urban households and 89% to individ-
uals from rural households. Alternatively, by wealth quintile, the
utilization of EHP falls 38%, 13%, 23%, 14% and 11% as you
move from the poorest to the richest households. Our base case esti-
mate for the distribution of the health opportunity cost is that 17%
of forgone health benefits are among individuals from urban house-
holds and 83% are for individuals from rural households. By wealth
quintiles, the distribution is 23%, 22%, 22%, 20% and 19% from
poorest to richest. In other words, for every one DALY that could
be averted by expanding general health service expenditure, 0.83
DALYs would be averted among the rural population and 0.17
among the urban population. Figure 1 shows that, per person, dis-
ease burden and healthcare utilization broadly reduce by wealth
quintile, and rates across rural and urban individuals are similar.
Intervention impact on net health and equity
Figure 2 shows the 73 potential EHP interventions on the health
equity impact plane, according to their impact on health inequality
by wealth index. The underlying data for Figure 2 are provided in
Table S5 in the Supplementary Appendix.
We find interventions in all four quadrants of the plane. Out of
43 interventions that increase population net health benefit and re-
duce health inequality, 36 (84%) are in the current EHP. Of 13
interventions for which we estimate negative population benefit but
reductions in health inequality, 8 (62%) are included in the EHP. Of
the seven interventions with positive population net health benefit
and that increase health inequality, 3 (43%) are in the EHP. Out of
10 interventions with negative population net health benefit, and
that increase health inequality, 4 (40%) are in the EHP.
EHP impact across socioeconomic groups
Figure 3 illustrates the socioeconomic distribution of impacts of the
51 interventions in the current EHP at current levels of health ser-
vice utilization (Figure 3a and b), and if utilization were increased to
100% (Figure 3c and d). Of the 51 EHP interventions, 39 have posi-
tive incremental net health benefit (Supplementary Table S5).
Due to variation in the types of intervention used in each socioe-
conomic group, the direct health benefits from the EHP are very het-
erogeneous. Supplementary Table S4 shows the distribution of
utilization across socioeconomic groups, and the incremental direct
benefits for each intervention, allowing a comparison of the average
direct health benefit across the interventions used in each socioeco-
nomic group and the potential direct health benefit of services not
used due to low uptake. The poorest households currently use EHP
interventions that avert 1.18 DALYs but underutilize EHP interven-
tions that could avert an additional 1.64 DALYs on average. Poorer
households avert 0.67 DALYs with their current patterns of use and
underutilize services that could avert on average 0.47 DALYs. The
corresponding figures of DALYs averted with current patterns of
use are 1.14 for middle wealth households, 0.65 for richer house-
holds and 0.34 for the richest households. The forgone DALYs
averted due to underutilization are 0.76 for middle wealth
Box 2. Summary of key assumptions
• The socioeconomic status of survey respondents is a
suitable proxy for the socioeconomic status of their
children and siblings (or for children only in
Sensitivity Analysis 4).
• The socioeconomic distribution of self-reported dis-
ease in the last 2 weeks is a suitable proxy for the
socioeconomic distribution of disease prevalence
(varied in Sensitivity Analysis 1).
• The socioeconomic distribution of self-reported care
seeking for each disease is a suitable proxy for the
socioeconomic distribution of utilization of EHP inter-
ventions for that disease (varied in Sensitivity
Analysis 2).
• The direct health benefit of each person receiving an
intervention is the same regardless of socioeconomic
status, i.e. we assume equal efficacy of interventions
across socioeconomic groups.
• The socioeconomic pattern in care seeking across all
diseases reported in the IHS describes the pattern of
use of healthcare services in Malawi (varied in
Sensitivity Analysis 3).
• The socioeconomic distribution in utilization of health
services represents the socioeconomic distribution
that would be observed for marginal changes in
healthcare provision (Varied in Sensitivity Analysis 2).
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households, 0.34 for richer households and 0.49 for the richest
households.
We estimate that, on average, the EHP averts 0.51 DALYs per
person in Malawi. This is composed from 0.53 DALYs averted per
individual from rural households and 0.38 DALYs averted per indi-
vidual from urban households. Alternatively, by wealth quintile, it is
composed from 0.85 DALYs averted for each individual from the
poorest wealth quintile, 0.35 DALYs averted per individual from
the poorer quintile, 0.86 from the middle, 0.37 from the richer and
0.10 from the richest. Though the direct health benefits are highest
for individuals in the poorest households, those individuals also
carry the highest opportunity cost.
If utilization is increased to 100%, urban households would
benefit from 0.57 DALYs averted in total, an increase of 50% com-
pared to current utilization, and the benefit to rural households
would increase to 0.82 DALYs (Figure 2c), an increase of 55%.
Table 1 Population, diseases and health services by socioeconomic group in millions
Total population,
n
Residence Wealth quintiles
Rural,
n (% of pop)
Urban,
n (% of pop)
Poorest,
n (% of pop)
Poorer,
n (% of pop)
Middle,
n (% of pop)
Richer,
n (% of pop)
Richest,
n (% of pop)
Population size 17.5 14.9 (85) 2.6 (15) 3.5 (20) 3.5 (20) 3.5 (20) 3.5 (20) 3.5 (20)
Disease cases
(prevalence)
43.9 37.8 (86) 6.9 (14) 15.8 (36) 6.9 (16) 10.3 (23) 5.8 (13) 5.1 (12)
Health service
utilized
(utilization)
19.9 17.6 (88) 2.2 (11) 7.6 (38) 2.6 (13) 4.6 (23) 2.8 (14) 2.2 (11)
Pop. average,
%
% of disease
cases
% of disease
cases
% of disease
cases
% of disease
cases
% of disease
cases
% of disease
cases
% of disease
cases
Uptake
(services/
diseases)
45 47 37 48 37 45 49 44
Total % of total
opp. cost
% of total
opp. cost
% of total
opp. cost
% of total
opp. cost
% of total
opp. cost
% of total
opp. cost
% of total
opp. cost
Opportunity
cost
1 DALY per $61 83 17 23 22 20 19 16
(a)
(b)
Figure 1 (a) Cases of illness and health services used per person (before imputation). (b) Cases of illness and health services used per person (after imputation).
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The poorest quintile would benefit the most from increased uptake,
leading to net benefit of a 1.97 averted DALY per person, a gain of
127%. Similarly, the DALYs averted in the middle wealth quintile
households would increase to 1.17, an increase of 36%. However,
the other wealth quintiles stand to lose from increased coverage of
the EHP. The increased health opportunity costs in these groups out-
weigh the gains in direct health benefits.
Impact on distribution of HALE
Figure 4a and b illustrates how introduction of the EHP would
change the distribution of HALE. Average baseline HALE is
49.15 years in urban residents and 53.18 years in rural households.
Using the Atkinson index with an inequality aversion parameter of
10, this gives a baseline EDE HALE of 52.46 years compared to a
baseline average HALE of 52.70, indicating a cost of inequality
equal to 0.24 DALYs per person. The EHP increases HALE by
0.505years on average, with 0.381 years for urban households and
0.526 healthy life years for rural households. The EHP improves the
EDE HALE by 0.489 on average, leaving the cost of inequality in
the post-EHP distribution equal to 0.26 DALYs per person.
By wealth quintile, baseline HALE varies between 49.85 (poor-
est) and 55.30 (middle).1 Given this baseline distribution, our use of
an inequality aversion parameter of 10 results in an Atkinson index
of 0.006. This implies a willingness to sacrifice 0.6% of total popu-
lation health in Malawi, to eliminate inequality in HALE by wealth.
The EHP increases HALE by 0.505 and EDE HALE by 0.516,
indicating a reduction in inequality between wealth quintiles. At
population level, the current 51 EHP interventions provide 8.87 mil-
lion additional healthy life years, the EDE of which is 9.2 million
healthy life years (given aversion to inequality in health by wealth
quintile). The inequality impact is therefore equivalent in value to
an additional 0.33 million DALYs averted (3.7% of the health bene-
fits of the EHP).
Priority ordering based on population net health benefit
vs based on EDE
We compare prioritization of interventions by incremental net
health benefit against ranking based on changes in EDE
(Supplementary Table S5 in the Appendix). If all interventions with
a positive incremental population net health benefit were selected,
this would design a health benefits package of 50 interventions (out
of 73 potential). If all interventions with positive change in EDE
were selected, the health benefits package would include those same
50 interventions, and an additional 1 intervention with positive im-
pact on EDE (high cholesterol treatment) but negative net health
benefit.
Sensitivity analysis
Table 2 provides an overview of the base case results and the sensi-
tivity analyses considering health inequality by wealth quintile.
Assuming equal distribution of disease reduces the estimated benefit
from the 51 interventions in the current EHP. The estimated change
in EDE health becomes lower than the change in population health
benefit, suggesting that the EHP would increase the cost of inequal-
ity to 0.72 million DALYs. In contrast, assuming a more unequal
disease burden doubles the estimated value of the EHP, in reducing
Figure 2 Equity plane, outliers ignored.
1 As health-adjusted life expectancy is a non-linear weighted
function of the age-specific rates, we get a slight discrepancy
when disaggregating by wealth quintiles (52.78) vs residence
(52.59).
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inequality to 0.67 million DALYs averted compared to the base case
(0.33 million DALYs averted).
Assuming equal uptake of interventions over all socioeconomic
groups also reduces the estimated benefits of the EHP. Conversely,
assuming a more unequal uptake, weighted in favour of the poorest
and poorer, quintiles increases the amount by which the EHP is esti-
mated to improve population health and EDE, increasing the esti-
mated value of the reduction in health inequality with the EHP to
0.51 million DALYs averted.
Assuming equally distributed opportunity cost increases the
amount by which the EHP is estimated to impact EDE health, while
leaving the overall gain in population health unchanged. In contrast,
assuming that health opportunity cost falls more heavily on the
poorer and poorest quintiles reduces the amount by which the EHP
is estimated to improve EDE health to 0.15 million DALYs averted.
Using only deaths for survey respondent’s offspring to inform
the distribution of mortality provides an alternative distribution of
baseline health by wealth quintiles. Healthy life expectancy is
50.32 years in poorest households, 51.82 in poorer households,
53.98 in middle households, 53.18 in richer households and 54.30
in richest households. This indicates a clearer association between
wealth and HALE. Changing baseline health does not affect the esti-
mated net population benefit from the EHP, but it does affect its im-
pact on the EDE. Imposing the EHP on this alternative baseline
distribution implies 0.73 million DALYs averted due to reduction in
inequality.
For all scenarios, except those varying the level of the health op-
portunity cost and the level of health inequality aversion, the num-
ber of interventions estimated to reduce health inequality is sensitive
to the alternative assumptions tested, but the number with overall
positive impact on EDE is relatively insensitive. For these sensitivity
analyses, the direction of the inequality impact and the magnitude of
the gains from each intervention are affected, but not the conclusion
about the set that should be prioritized for inclusion in a health ben-
efits package when impacts on overall health and health inequality
are combined.
Assuming health opportunity cost of one DALY averted per $37
reduces the estimated benefit of the EHP on both population health
and health inequality. The value of the impact on inequality is
reduced to 0.27 million DALYs averted. At this higher average
health opportunity cost, only 45 interventions improve population
health (averting 9.2 million DALYs) and 46 interventions improve
EDE health. In contrast, assuming opportunity cost of one DALY
averted per $116 increases the estimated impact of the EHP, leading
to an additional gain of 0.38 million DALYs averted due to reduc-
tion in inequality. With lower health opportunity costs, 53 interven-
tions would be estimated to improve population health (averting
13.5 million DALYs) and inequality. The set of interventions that
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 3 (a) Direct benefit, opportunity cost and net benefit* with expected service utilization by residence. (b) Direct benefit, opportunity cost and net benefit*
with expected service utilization by wealth quintile. (c) Direct benefit, opportunity cost and net benefit* with full service utilization by residence. (d) Direct benefit,
opportunity cost and net benefit* with full service utilization by wealth quintile. *Direct benefits, opportunity cost and net benefits are measured in averted DALY.
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would be prioritized differently, depending on the level of health op-
portunity cost, includes nine interventions (‘HIV interventions
focused on female sex workers’, ‘HIV interventions focused on men
who have sex with men’, ‘intermittent preventive therapy for preg-
nant women’, ‘high cholesterol treatment’, ‘management of moder-
ate acute malnutrition in pregnant and lactating women’,
‘management of severe malnutrition in children’, ‘diarrhoea treat-
ment with zinc’, ‘antibiotics for preterm premature rupture of mem-
brane’ and ‘maternal sepsis case management’).
Assuming very low or very high aversion to inequality in health
by wealth quintile leaves the amount by which the EHP is estimated
to increase population health unaffected but alters its impact on the
EDE health. However, the number of interventions estimated to in-
crease EDE health is insensitive to both scenarios.
Discussion
This is the first study to quantify the impact of a health benefits
package on health inequality. Broadly, we found that there are data
sources in LMICs that allow the estimation of socioeconomic distri-
butions in disease prevalence, healthcare utilization and life expect-
ancy. Using these, we could apply methods for aggregate DCEA. We
found relatively little difference in overall net health benefits be-
tween urban and rural households, but that the EHP may be reduc-
ing differences in healthy life expectancy between wealth quintiles.
The current EHP was informed by cost-effectiveness analysis,
but the selection of interventions was not based solely on whether
they improve net population health. Our findings indicate that the
probability of selection was higher for interventions that are health
improving (78%—39 out of 50) and for those that we estimate to re-
duce inequality (79%—44 out of 56), compared to those that reduce
population health (52%—12 out of 23) or that reduce inequality
(41%—7 out of 17). Our study builds upon the earlier evaluation of
interventions in Malawi by Ochalek et al. (2018) who focused on
identifying best buys, and how health system constraints limit the
implementation of the EHP. These health system constraints
included factors on the demand side (such as lack of perceived bene-
fits and difficulties in access) as well as factors on the supply side
(such as lack of equipment or staff, supply chain bottlenecks, water
and power shortages). Our analysis of survey information confirms
that service use is suboptimal, with 45% uptake on average.
Ochalek et al. find that the value of increasing coverage of the EHP
outweighs the benefits from extending the package to include add-
itional health promoting services. Our study adds to this by showing
the potential reduction in health inequality, if uptake of health serv-
ices is increased.
The results indicate how potential health package interventions
differ in their impact on health inequality and population net health
benefit. The survey data provide an indication that the diseases tar-
geted by the Malawian EHP are most common in the poorest house-
holds. At the same time, we find that the number of EHP services
utilized is highest in poorest households. However, they do not gain
the most from current patterns of EHP access. We found that the se-
lection of health interventions used by the poorest households averts
fewer DALYs, on average, than the selection of interventions used
by households in the middle wealth quintile. Interventions with high
direct health benefits, such as active management of third stage of
labour, first-line tuberculosis treatment and management of
obstructed labour, remain underutilized by the poorest households
and, if. We did not explore the demand and supply side barriers that
lead to this selection, but our results might indicate priority areas for
future research to explain whether it is ameliorated by expanding ac-
cess to the EHP. If full utilization of the EHP could be realized,
poorest households would stand to gain the most.
Our results describe the distributional impact of the current EHP
in the context of any current barriers to implementation and utiliza-
tion. They therefore favour interventions that are more accessible to
the poor, in addition to interventions for conditions that are more
prevalent among the poor. Health service interventions that address
demand and supply side barriers to the implementation of the EHP
would influence the distributional impact of the EHP and the set of
optimal interventions we identify. For example, introducing user
fees for some services might reduce utilization disproportionately
among the lower wealth quintiles and make those services less likely
to reduce health inequality. However, the revenue generated by user
fees may allow for the expansion of the EHP. The methods we
(a) (b)
Figure 4 (a) Health-adjusted life expectancy by residence. (b) Health-adjusted life expectancy by wealth quintile.
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propose here, and our results on current utilization, could assist in
designing user fees to optimize their impact on health inequality.
Our study has limitations. We relied on survey information and
a series of assumptions to estimate socioeconomic distributions of
mortality, morbidity, direct benefits and foregone health.
We ranked households according to their relative position in
the wealth distribution. Malawi is, however, one of the poorest
countries in the world. The socioeconomic gradient between the
poorest and richest households is comparatively slight. Even
among the richest quintile, only 60% have access to electricity and
40% only have access to low quality water. Being rich in Malawi
does not guarantee a high standard of living, and there may not be
strong aversion to health inequality associated with wealth. Since
the purpose of this study was to demonstrate the feasibility of
DCEA, we did not yet consult policymakers in Malawi as to which
socioeconomic characteristics best describe the nature of their
health inequality concern. Future applications should be informed
by the values of those bearing legitimate authority for determining
healthcare resource allocation.
Self-reported disease might be systematically biased. This is a
known problem in Malawi, especially in relation to rural commun-
ities and sensitive information (Baird and Ozler, 2012), diseases
involving stigma (Bignami-Van Assche et al., 2007) or interviewees
answering according to the social desirability (Kelly et al., 2013).
The mortality rates reported in the DHS are for the respondent’s
siblings and children. While socioeconomic characteristics do cor-
relate within families and between siblings, the socioeconomic
characteristics of the respondent are not necessarily the same as
those of their siblings or children (Solon et al., 1991; Heflin and
Pattillo, 2006).
For future applications, cohort studies and initiatives such as
the INDEPTH network might provide better information on socio-
economic differences in health (INDEPTH Resource & Training
Centre, 2019). However, while changes in the baseline socioeco-
nomic pattern of healthy life expectancy affected our conclusions
about the overall equity impact of the EHP, the prioritization of
different interventions for inclusion in a health benefits package
was not affected.
We made a set of strong assumptions, to which we applied a
series of sensitivity analyses to test how changes to distributional
patterns in mortality, disease prevalence, health service uptake, op-
portunity cost and the overall level of opportunity cost and in-
equality aversion affected our conclusions. We found that changing
the distributional patterns affects the magnitude and, in the case of
the prevalence of disease, the direction by which the EHP is esti-
mated to change health inequality. However, the selection of inter-
ventions to include in a health benefits package was relatively
insensitive. We found that only the level of health opportunity cost
has substantial impact on the potential size of the health benefits
package. One assumption we did not address was that of equal dir-
ect health benefit from a given intervention, regardless of the indi-
vidual’s socioeconomic characteristics. If wealthier individuals
have greater capacity to benefit from interventions, we will have
overestimated the direct health benefits to the poorest and poten-
tially overestimated the reduction in health inequality from the
EHP. However, given the mild wealth gradient in Malawi, it is un-
likely that differential efficacy in wealth quintiles would affect our
results.
Overall, we find that it is feasible to use aggregate DCEA to
support the design of health benefits packages in two ways: first,
by providing a structure for assessing the distributional impact of
interventions and thus enabling formal deliberation on inequalityTa
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impacts and, second, by providing a rational approach for evaluat-
ing any trade-off between impacts on health inequality and overall
population health. The data used in this study are publicly available
and thus this analysis could be replicated in other LMICs.
Conclusion
Our analysis finds that the Malawian EHP includes interventions
which target diseases that occur disproportionately among the poor-
est households. However, its impacts on improving healthy life ex-
pectancy and reducing health inequality are limited by
socioeconomic patterns in underutilization. The DCEA framework
allowed us to estimate the impact of each intervention on health in-
equality and to demonstrate that the set of health services used by
the poorest households is comparatively less beneficial than those
used by richer households. Despite facing several challenges when
conducting DCEA in a data constrained setting such as Malawi, we
found the DCEA framework to be a feasible and transparent method
to explore the equity impact of health benefits packages in LMICs.
Supplementary data
Supplementary data are available at Health Policy and Planning online.
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